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In contrast to the mass of empirical papers dealing with var-
ious aspects of development aid, there is a surprisingly narrow
body of theoretical literature devoted to the joint question of
aid eﬀectiveness and allocation of available funds by donors.
If we leave aside the research pieces that use a macroeconomic
framework (see Azam & Laﬀont, 2003, for a useful survey), we
ﬁnd that this limited literature is focused on agency problems.
One particular issue that has received scant attention so far is
the impact of aid supply, or the volume of aid, on aid eﬀective-
ness. Such an issue has become especially critical nowadays
since the donor community puts emphasis on the twin needs
to increase aid to poor countries (see the objectives of the Mil-
lennium Development Goals, launched by the United
Nations) and to enhance aid eﬀectiveness. The two objectives
are obviously interdependent since donor agencies are unable
to mobilize more money for development aid unless they per-
suade the taxpayers or voluntary contributors that the funds
are put to good uses and, in particular, reach the poor eﬀec-
tively. It is therefore important to look at the way aid eﬀective-
ness is aﬀected by aid availability. Note that the issue remains
as topical in times of growing aid scarcity, such as seems to
happen in a number of donor countries as a result of the Glo-
bal Economic Crisis. We are then interested in knowing
whether reduced aid availability can hinder or enhance aid
eﬀectiveness.
The problem is far from trivial because the neediest coun-
tries tend to also be the worst governed and, therefore, those
where aid is least eﬀectively used: there is at least a signiﬁcant
(inverse) correlation, if not causal relationship, between gover-
nance and poverty (Collier, 2007, chap. 5). There are then
three conceivable answers to the above question. The ﬁrst line
of argument is based on the normative principle that aid ought
to accrue in priority to the neediest. Thus, Liberia receives an
amount of aid that exceeds its national budget although it is
considered the most corrupt country in the world according
to the ranking of Transparency International (Economist,
2011). Since the late 1970s till the early 2000s, this approach6dominated the aid literature which tended to assess aid perfor-
mance of donor countries on the basis of their eﬀort to direct
aid toward countries with lower per capita incomes (see, e.g.,
McGillivray, 1989; McGillivray & White, 1995; McKinlay &
Little, 1977). It is well reﬂected in the proposition by
Thirlwall (2011) that aid assistance ought to be distributed
on a per capita basis according to some target level of per cap-
ita income, a principle “which would operate rather like an
international negative income tax” (p. 476). Revealingly,
Thirlwall glossed over the governance problem by pointing
out that “all this would be conditional, of course, on the
new guiding principle of good governance” (p. 476).
The second line, popularized in the early 2000s by Burnside
and Dollar (2000) and Alesina and Dollar (2000), draws atten-
tion to the critical role of aid eﬀectiveness and the need to con-
sider the quality of institutions and policies in recipient
countries as the new criterion of aid allocation. Various mea-
sures of aid quality incorporating that criterion have thus been
proposed (see, e.g., Berthele´my & Tichit, 2004; Birdsall,
Claessens, & Diwan, 2003; Birdsall & Kharas, 2010; Easterly
& Pfutze, 2008; Knack, Rogers, & Eubank, 2010; Roodman,
2012). From a normative standpoint, the central idea behind
the so-called “country-selectivity” approach is that aid should
ﬁrst be given to potential beneﬁciaries with the best gover-
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tolerance for corruption”.
Finally, the third line allows explicitly for a trade-oﬀ
between needs and governance. It therefore addresses upfront
the issue escaped in the statement by Collier and Dollar (2002)
according to which “to maximize the reduction in poverty, aid
should be allocated to countries that have large amounts of
poverty and good policy” (p. 1482).
Depending on the normative approach chosen, the eﬀect of
aid supply on aid eﬀectiveness diﬀers if we measure aid eﬀec-
tiveness by the proportion of the aid ﬂow that actually reaches
the poor and therefore helps to improve their welfare. When
the volume of aid is increased, the additional amounts avail-
able may accrue to better, or worse governed countries (or
regions, or communities), and it may therefore be useful to dis-
tinguish between average and marginal aid eﬀectiveness. Mar-
ginal aid eﬀectiveness then measures the proportion of the
additional amount of aid available that eﬀectively reaches
the poor whereas average aid eﬀectiveness measures the pro-
portion of the aggregate aid amount that reaches the poor.
A direct implication of the needs-based approach is that
more aid will cause the marginal (and average) eﬀectiveness
of aid to rise: the donor community begins by serving the
needs of the poorest but also worse governed potential beneﬁ-
ciaries and, as more aid becomes available, it gradually shifts
its eﬀorts toward less poor but also better governed beneﬁcia-
ries. In contrast, the governance-based approach leads to the
opposite implication: since priority is given to the better gov-
erned countries, the marginal (and average) eﬀectiveness of aid
falls as the aid amount grows bigger (unless, of course, this
approach denies aid to all countries below a certain threshold
of good governance, as the view of “zero tolerance for corrup-
tion” would imply). The needs-based approach thus implies
that the ﬁrst units of aid money have a low impact on poverty
reduction in the sense that the poorest are reached but in low
numbers. Therefore, a relatively large quantity of aid is
required to reach them all, before attention can be shifted to
less needy people. By contrast, the governance-based
approach implies that not-so-poor people are helped yet in
comparatively large numbers. The amount of aid required to
remove poverty among them is relatively modest.
Finally, donors may be interested in aid outreach rather
than aid eﬀectiveness as measured above. How many poor
people, however far they may be from the poverty line can
be reached by aid eﬀorts is then their central concern. Finally,
they may be concerned with the extent of poverty reduction or
the poor’s welfare. When the volume of aid is constant, the lat-
ter criterion is obviously equivalent to that of aid eﬀectiveness:
when aid is more eﬀective, the absolute amount of money
accruing to the poor increases (while aid outreach may
improve or not). When the volume of aid is varied, the equiv-
alence is no more guaranteed. If the poor receive a lower share
of a larger total fund or a higher share of a reduced fund, it is
not possible to say a priori whether the poor’s welfare moves
in the same direction as aid eﬀectiveness.
The aim of the present paper is to probe further into the
relationship between aid availability, on the one hand, and
aid eﬀectiveness, aid outreach, and the poor’s welfare, on the
other hand. Special emphasis is put on the trade-oﬀ approach
under which the eﬀect of aid availability is hard to elucidate
without the support of a formal framework. Before embarking
upon this central task, it is nevertheless useful to deepen our
understanding of the analytics of the governance-based
approach and its implications in terms of the eﬀects of aid
availability on aid eﬀectiveness, aid outreach, and poverty
reduction. This is done, in Section 2, by reviewing signiﬁcantpieces of the relevant theoretical literature that uses a
one-donor–one-beneﬁciary or a one-donor–multiple-beneﬁci
aries framework. Section 3 then looks at the issue of aid allo-
cation with multiple recipient countries when the donor’s util-
ity function balances needs against governance considerations.
The ﬁrst approach we review assumes the existence of random
shocks that make reform eﬀorts of recipient countries
non-observable (SubSection 3(a)). Thereafter, we look at
papers that explicitly model the donor’s allocation choice
between countries that diﬀer ex ante in terms of governance
quality (SubSection 3(b)). In a ﬁrst step, we consider models
that assume the quality of domestic governance as exogenous
and, in a second step, we examine an eﬀort to address the
problem of aid allocation when the donor is able or willing
to inﬂuence the outcome of governance by adding external
to internal discipline of the national elites. In Section 4, we
summarize the main results of our survey, and discuss their
policy implications.
The central lesson that emerges from the review is that
greater aid availability decreases aid eﬀectiveness under a vari-
ety of conceptual frameworks. Yet, the mechanism underlying
the decreasing return to aid diﬀers according to the framework
chosen. In particular, the decreasing impact of aid may either
be due to the behavior of the local elites when they receive a
greater amount of external resources on behalf of their con-
stituency (the project or program size eﬀect), or to the behav-
ior of the donor agency when it has more plentiful aid to
allocate between potential recipient countries with diﬀerent
characteristics (the selection eﬀect).
Moreover, a donor’s utility function that embodies the
need-governance trade-oﬀ, such as the one proposed by
Bourguignon/Platteau (2013), and the associated optimization
mechanism yield a meaningful rule to guide inter-country allo-
cation of aid resources. This rule does not present the prob-
lems inherent in rules emphasizing aid eﬀectiveness at the
expense of considerations of needs, or rules focusing on pov-
erty reduction regardless of aid embezzlement or misuse. At
the heart of the new approach to optimal aid allocation lies
the concept of need-adjusted aid eﬀectiveness which is a com-
bined measure of the needs and governance quality in a coun-
try.
Note that we have refrained from establishing a link
between the above theoretical prediction and the empirical lit-
erature on aid eﬀectiveness. This is not only because there are
several plausible mechanisms at work, and they need to be
carefully distinguished (in particular, the project size eﬀect
must be distinguished from the selection eﬀect), but also
because there are numerous and complex methodological
and measurement problems that plague this empirical litera-
ture. Looking at it from the standpoint of the impact of aid
supply on aid eﬀectiveness is clearly beyond the scope of this
paper, whose main focus is theoretical.2. THE GOVERNANCE-BASED APPROACH
(a) Optimal aid contracting with multiple countries of unknown
(governance) type
In the pioneer paper by Azam and Laﬀont (2003), the
authors look for the optimal aid contract that will best miti-
gate the moral hazard problem arising from the presence of
an intermediary whose actions are imperfectly observed. Some
form of conditionality needs to be applied to moderate the
eﬀects of opportunism by local elites or governments. The
optimal contract speciﬁes that the recipient government will
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dent on the level of consumption of the poor that it provides.
This obviously implies that aid must just be disbursed only
after observing the consumption of the poor (p. 52).
Assuming that the donor is imperfectly informed about the
recipient government’s concern for the poor, Azam and Laf-
font ask the question as to how the optimal aid contract must
be altered to take into account the strategic behavior of the
government about its private information. What they claim
is that the donor can surmount this adverse selection problem
by denying aid to governments of countries which have too
low a level of altruism (or poverty aversion), so as to decrease
the information rents accruing to the local rich. To put it in
another way, the donor should help countries “which have a
high enough quality of governance” (p. 40), and which also
turn out to be those where the poor have the highest consump-
tion level. In more technical terms, the incentive compatibility
constraint requires the donor to give a costly rent to “good”
governments in order to deter them from pretending that they
are “bad”. In the Azam–Laﬀont framework, the aid contract is
equivalent to a truthful revelation mechanism: it associates
with each announcement of governance quality level (as
reﬂected in the poverty aversion parameter) by the elite or gov-
ernment of the recipient country a level of aid and a required
consumption level of the poor. The rent conceded to the
“good” government measures the cost to the donor of its igno-
rance about the recipients’ altruism. In the presence of a par-
ticipation constraint on the side of the donor—the donor
country also cares for the consumption of its own citizens,
and these citizens will provide aid only if it increases their wel-
fare thanks to their altruistic preferences—, it would be too
costly to provide the right incentives to “good governments”
if aid also has to be supplied to “bad governments” (pp. 30,
43). 1
It bears emphasis, however, that Azam and Laﬀont do not
really address the issue of inter-country allocation of aid
resources. They actually assume that their own-country model
can be extended to several countries, which is not a fully sat-
isfactory approach. It is, therefore, in a limited sense that they
can talk about country selection by the donor. In particular,
their analytical framework does not allow them to consider
recipient countries which diﬀer in wealth or income. More-
over, owing to the restrictive assumption regarding the utility
functions for both the donor and the recipient countries -the
functions being quasi-linear, no wealth eﬀect can exist-, it is
impossible to derive any meaningful implication of Azam–Laf-
font model for our problem of the eﬀect of aid availability on
aid eﬀectiveness or outreach. It is nevertheless easy to imagine
what would happen if incomes were higher in the donor coun-
try provided that the marginal utility of own consumption is
decreasing yet not the marginal utility of the public good rep-
resented by the consumption of the poor in the recipient coun-
tries. In these conditions, as income rises in the donor country,
its government would presumably decide to lower the thresh-
old of good governance that makes poor countries eligible for
development assistance. We thus reach the conclusion men-
tioned in Section 1, namely that marginal aid eﬀectiveness
decreases as availability of aid resources increases. Whether
aid outreach improves cannot be determined.
A similar conclusion is also reached when two alternative
set-ups focusing on governance problems are used. In the ﬁrst
of these setups, proposed by Wahhaj (2008), attention is again
drawn to the issue of adverse selection of local leaders or elite,
yet there is now an explicit recognition of the impact of the aid
amount available on eﬀectiveness. The aid amount plays a role
through project size which bears upon the incentive of theleaders to exert more or less eﬀort (to steal more or less of
the aid money) in the context of the development project. In
the second setup, due to Gaspart and Platteau (2012), there
is no selection issue and the focus is entirely on the moral haz-
ard problem created by the opportunistic and non-observable
behavior of the leader. Again, the eﬀect of aid supply on eﬀec-
tiveness (and outreach) is explicitly brought out and even con-
stitutes the central aim of the whole exercise.
Let us now review the two above approaches in more detail
so as to gain a better grasp of the underlying mechanisms.
(b) A general framework with multiple potential leaders of
unknown (governance) type
Wahhaj (2008) starts by specifying the welfare function of a
local government, whether national, regional or municipal, or
the welfare function of the local elite through which the aid
funds are channeled. He assumes that the local leader or elite
cares about his own personal rewards as well as the beneﬁts
that accrue to his community (the nation, a region, a munici-
pality, or a rural community). The most natural way to repre-
sent this preference is by using an altruistic function in which a
unitary weight is attached to the personal utility obtained by
the leader, and a smaller weight, say h, to the welfare of the
community (h < 1). In the literature, such a utility function
is sometimes referred to as “paternalistic altruism” (Azam &
Laﬀont, 2003), or considered to reﬂect a “traditional aristo-
cratic governance structure” (Foster & Rosenzweig, 2002).
One possible way to justify this approach is by conceiving of
the coeﬃcient of altruism as describing aversion to poverty.
Wahhaj (2008) also considers that the leader chooses the
quality of the input which he is ready to put into the aid devel-
opment project. Higher values of this input lead to an
improved welfare of the community yet increase the cost for
the leader. The input in question can be thought of as a level
of eﬀort produced by the leader or, negatively, as the amount
of embezzlement of the aid funds that he chooses to commit.
In the latter case, a low value of the leader’s input is associated
with a higher level of fraud. On the other hand, the leader
receives a ﬁxed material reward (a “wage” or a premium) from
the aid agency and this contributes positively to his utility. The
utility of the community, which enters the leader’s utility with
the weight h, depends positively on the quality of the afore-
mentioned input applied by the leader, and the amount of
money allocated for the project by the donor.
Imagine now that there exist leaders of diﬀerent types corre-
sponding to diﬀerent levels of altruism or poverty aversion, as
measured by coeﬃcient hi. Each leader also has an outside
option such that he would be willing to participate in a devel-
opment project only if his own utility exceeds that outside
option (this is his participation constraint). The problem of
a leader of a certain type is therefore to choose his input qual-
ity level so as to maximize his utility. The aid agency seeks to
maximize its own utility function which corresponds to that of
the community. Toward that purpose, it chooses the values of
two decision variables, the “wage” paid to the leader and the
amount of money allocated to the project (that is, the size of
the project). In doing so, it is nevertheless constrained by the
participation constraint of the leader.
The key point is that there is a critical value of h for which
the leader is just indiﬀerent between accepting a project
deﬁned by the parameters chosen by the aid agency (wage
and project size), and his outside option. If the value of hi cor-
responding to a certain type of leader is smaller than this crit-
ical value, they will refuse to participate in the project and
prefer their outside option whereas if the value of hi exceeds
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follows from the fact that a leader’s utility from the project can
be shown to be increasing in h, once he has made his optimal
choice of the level of input applied to the project. It is also
increasing in the size of the project, and in the “wage” received
from the aid agency. The positive relationship between the lea-
der’s utility and the size of the project is obtained despite the
fact that the leader decreases his eﬀort (or increases his embez-
zlement) as the project aid fund becomes larger. On the con-
trary, the leader increases his eﬀort (or decreases his
embezzlement) when the “wage” or his poverty aversion is
higher. 2 On the other hand, the welfare of the community
increases with h, the “wage” paid to the leader, and the size
of the project (see Wahhaj, 2008, for proofs).
From the above results, we may immediately infer that the
critical level of poverty aversion above which a potential lea-
der is willing to engage in the project is lowered as the “wage”
paid to the leader is higher or the size of the project fund is lar-
ger. The rationale behind these twin results is as follows. For a
given level of altruism and eﬀort, increasing the wage or the
project size would increase the utility of the leader. Therefore,
as the wage or project size increases, less altruistic leaders
would be able to attain the reservation utility by applying this
level of eﬀort. They might opt for a diﬀerent level of eﬀort
which provides them higher utility, but the important point
is that these less altruistic leaders will be able to reach the
reservation utility. As a consequence, the threshold level of
altruism must decline when the wage or project size increases.
In real world situations, the leader’s eﬀort (or extent of
fraud) and his type such as it is reﬂected by his coeﬃcient of
altruism or poverty aversion, are typically not observable by
the aid agency. Under these conditions, an increase in the
aid fund allocated to a project (or a higher “wage”) will not
necessarily lead to a better outcome. There are actually two
opposite eﬀects of more abundant aid on the expected welfare
of the community. On the one hand, there is the positive eﬀect
which an increased aid fund generates for the community for
each type of leader. On the other hand, there is the negative
eﬀect arising from the fact that when more funds are available,
less altruistic leaders enter the pool of leaders willing to man-
age projects.
Translated into the language of aid eﬀectiveness, aid out-
reach, and poor’s welfare, and interpreting the input level as
the rate of appropriation of the aid ﬂow by a leader, the impli-
cations of Wahhaj’s analysis are the following. First, consider
the case where, in possession of a larger amount of aid
resources, the donor decides to increase the size of each exist-
ing project. Then, aid eﬀectiveness falls because each leader (of
a given type) appropriates a larger share of the project money.
On the other hand, the welfare of each community increases
since the poor are better taken care of. Aid outreach (the abso-
lute number of poor reached by the aid program) is unaﬀected.
The second case occurs when the donor decides to use the
additional amount of resources to multiply projects of a given
size. This requires that new leaders are mobilized to channel
aid. Because leaders with a lower poverty aversion or level
of altruism would participate in the new projects, a selection
eﬀect will now take place which lowers aid eﬀectiveness in
an “extensive” sense. On the other hand, aid eﬀectiveness in
the existing projects remains constant. Aid outreach obviously
improves. Finally, the donor may use the additional resources
to increase both the average project size and the number of
projects. In this instance, aid eﬀectiveness declines on two
counts: the intensive eﬀect (existing leaders appropriate a lar-
ger share of the aid ﬂow) and the extensive, selection eﬀect
(leaders with a lower poverty aversion or level of altruismreceive aid). Aid outreach again improves. As for community
welfare, it may possibly decrease but only in projects where
previous leaders are replaced by less altruistic ones as a result
of the increase in project size. In conclusion, the community
welfare is not always increasing in the volume of aid, and
aid eﬀectiveness is certain to decline if larger aid resources
are used to enlarge project size. Aid outreach improves or
stays constant.
(c) A two-period framework with one leader and one aid agency
with no uncertainty about type
In another recent paper, Gaspart and Platteau (2012) ana-
lyze explicitly the eﬀect of greater availability of aid funds
on eﬀectiveness in reaching poor beneﬁciaries. In contrast to
the two above setups, the aid agency is able to discipline the
local leader through a procedure of conditional disbursement
of aid money. Underlying this procedure is a mechanism of
fraud detection the eﬀectiveness of which varies with the
amount of supervision expenditures incurred by the agency.
Another signiﬁcant diﬀerence with the above-described
frameworks lies in the speciﬁcation of the leader’s utility func-
tion. Instead of the leader’s actions being inﬂuenced by altru-
istic (poverty aversion) considerations, they are here
constrained by the bargaining strength of the poor (commu-
nity members or citizens). However, the aid agency can
improve the situation of the poor by itself disciplining the lea-
der in the way suggested (ex post conditionality).
The game that is played out in Gaspart and Platteau’s model
has the three following stages. In the ﬁrst step, the aid agency
chooses three positive quantities of money, namely the
amount of aid money released at the beginning of the ﬁrst per-
iod (the ﬁrst tranche), the amount conditionally disbursed at
the end of this ﬁrst period if no fraud was detected (the second
tranche), and the supervision expenses. In the second stage,
the local leader (or the government) decides which part of
the ﬁrst tranche is handed over to the grassroots or the poor,
and which part is appropriated for own use. In the third stage,
the leader and the poor bargain over how the second tranche is
to be shared between them. Finally, a move of nature gives the
aid agency enough evidence against the leader’s fraud, or it
does not. If it does, the second tranche is not disbursed.
The unit cost of aid money for the aid agency is an exoge-
nous parameter which corresponds to the interest rate if the
money has to be borrowed, or to the cost of mobilizing it dur-
ing fund-raising campaigns, if it is not. The probability of
fraud detection is assumed to decrease with the share of the
aid fund earmarked for the poor (chosen by the leader), and
to increase with the monitoring budget (chosen by the aid
agency). The eﬀectiveness of fraud detection itself tends to
increase, and to decrease, as the amount embezzled and the
monitoring expenditures become larger, respectively.
Since the money is disbursed over a limited number of peri-
ods (there are two periods in this case), the leader is not disci-
plined in the last period given the absence of disbursement of
aid once this period has elapsed. The limited duration of the
“aid game” is a direct result of the fact that aid agencies typ-
ically aim at making beneﬁciaries eventually self-supporting,
and are therefore keen that their aid transfers stop after some
time. On the other hand, granting funds for a ﬁnite but inde-
terminate period is not a realistic option either. It would,
indeed, create perverse incentives to under-perform in order
to lengthen the project’s duration, thereby creating a “depen-
dency” syndrome.
Gaspart and Platteau’s way to overcome this problem is to
consider that the leader is not an all-powerful agent able to
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terminal period of the “aid game”. Besides this limited-
duration “aid game”, the leader participates in a long-term
“social game” of indeﬁnite or unlimited duration in which
he has to bargain with the poor. In the “social game”, corre-
sponding to a patron–client relationship, the poor organized
as a group are able to extract concessions from the leader
who has much to lose from the rebellion of his whole clientele
(his advantage is decisive only when he is able to deal with
each client separately). Conﬁdent that the poor will receive a
reasonable share of the last tranche, the aid agency is ready
to deliver it to the leader unless embezzlement has been
detected at the end of the previous period (see Gaspart &
Platteau, 2003).
An intermediate ﬁnding concerns the leader-disciplining
mechanism: when the aid agency decreases the amount of
the ﬁrst tranche, for given levels of the conditional transfer
(the second tranche) and supervision eﬀort, or when it
increases the conditional transfer for given levels of the ﬁrst
tranche and the supervision eﬀort, the local leader is induced
to raise the amount of aid money that goes to the poor during
the ﬁrst period. Larger supervision expenses, which increase
the probability of fraud detection, also reduce the amount
embezzled by the leader.
The central result is the following: when the cost of aid
money is lower and it is positively linked with total project
size, elite capture may increase enough to make the amount
of aid accruing to the poor become strictly smaller. In short,
greater availability of aid has the eﬀect of harming the poor.
The condition under which this phenomenon happens can be
seen as the presence of increasing returns-to-scale in the aid
activity. The optimal size of the aid project resulting from a
higher cost of aid money is indeed higher whenever increasing
returns-to-scale prevail. The most obvious source of increasing
returns-to-scale lies in the fact that monitoring expenditures
and the second, conditional tranche of aid money partly con-
stitute a ﬁxed cost for the aid agency in the framework of Gas-
part and Platteau’s model. It is therefore optimal to spread
them over a larger project size when the cost of aid money
increases.
The above result suggests that massive injections of cheap
money to alleviate poverty may end up enriching and consol-
idating local elites, much in the same way as windfall incomes
from natural resources can be a curse because they give rise to
greater rent-seeking activity (see, e.g., Tornell & Lane, 1998).3. THE TRADE-OFF APPROACH
(a) A two-country framework with endogenous reform eﬀort and
random shocks
Svensson (2000, 2003) has addressed the problem of the
trade-oﬀ between needs and governance in the particular con-
text of reforms. He analyzes a two-stage game among two
recipient countries and a donor who has an exogenous aid
budget. The two recipients are identical yet subject to indepen-
dently correlated shocks, so that their ex post situation may
diﬀer. The key assumption is that the probability of good
states increases monotonically with the amount of reform
eﬀort applied by the recipient country. In Svensson’s model
(2000), the aid contract thus speciﬁes the amount of aid dis-
bursed as a function of aggregate state (the conﬁguration of
the states of nature prevailing in each country) and reform
eﬀort. If the degree of implementation of the reforms is fully
contractible (the ﬁrst-best situation), so that the governanceproblem is actually surmounted, it is always optimal for the
aid agency to give aid to the most needy countries, and the
marginal utilities of aid across countries are equalized. (At
least, this is so if the total amount of aid available is large
enough to avoid a corner solution.) Moreover, the recipient
governments or elite are no better oﬀ with aid than without
(the poor appropriate the entire surplus from the recipient
government). Indeed, since aid is conditional on reform eﬀort
which is veriﬁable, the aid agency actually “buys a certain
amount of reform eﬀort for the aid it disburses” (p. 68). In
Svensson’s model, the poor derive their utility from the con-
sumption of a good that is either produced by the aid agency’s
resources, or provided by the recipient government. The latter
chooses how to allocate its budget between poverty-reduction
expenditures and expenditures that beneﬁt the rich.
When reform eﬀort or policies of recipient governments are
not observable, such as is the case in the real world, the opti-
mal contract can only be made conditional on the state of nat-
ure that is observed after the shock has occurred. The
second-best contract that then emerges is a compromise
between giving aid to those who most need it and providing
optimal incentives. This translates into the following donor’s
strategy: in order to induce the recipient to exert higher eﬀort,
aid ﬂows in bad states must be lowered and aid ﬂows in good
states (more likely to occur when reform eﬀort has been
higher) must be raised (p. 70). Three consequences follow:
(1) there will be less than full consumption smoothing across
countries; (2) the optimal amount of reform eﬀort will be
lower than in the ﬁrst-best situation; and (3) the recipient
governments will be strictly better-oﬀ and the aid agency
(and the poor) will be strictly worse oﬀ compared to the
ﬁrst-best.
Interestingly, Svensson believes there exists a serious com-
mitment or time-inconsistency problem on the side of the
donor: ex post, once the shock is realized, the donor is tempted
to increase disbursements to the country most in need. Antic-
ipation that this will happen in turn aﬀects the recipient’s
incentive to carry out politically costly reform policies ex ante.
As a result, donor’s discretion (modeled as a simultaneous
game) yields lower reform eﬀort (compared to the
second-best) but full consumption smoothing. Hence the
author’s attempt to look into other mechanisms that may pos-
sibly mitigate the donor’s commitment problem: tied project
aid, delegation to an agency with low poverty aversion (and,
therefore, more reliable as a committed donor), and competi-
tion between recipient countries for a given amount of aid in a
sort of tournament game (Svensson, 2000, 2003).
Svensson’s work is clearly an important contribution toward
understanding the trade-oﬀ between needs and governance.
Yet, it does not address the problem of the eﬀect of aid avail-
ability on the equilibrium allocation of aid between the recip-
ient countries. Moreover, the need-governance trade-oﬀ
appears as an equilibrium outcome and not as a dimension
featuring in the donor’s objective function. We now turn to
these questions by looking at the relevant literature.
(b) A two-country framework featuring both domestic and
external governance
(i) Allocating aid between two heterogeneous countries when
domestic governance is exogenous
In their paper, Collier and Dollar (2002) consider that the
donor has a ﬁxed amount of aid that he wants to allocate
between the recipient countries so as to maximize poverty
reduction (helping most people to escape from poverty) mea-
sured as
P
i
Gi/ihiN i, where Gi is the rate of growth of country
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income, hi is a measure of poverty (say, the headcount index),
and Ni is the size of its population. The rate of growth is inﬂu-
enced by the amount of aid received (assuming diminishing
returns), the quality of policies, pi, and the interaction between
these two variables (plus a number of exogenous factors).
Using their estimate of the growth equation, the authors arrive
at the following allocation formula:
Ai ¼ 13:5þ 7:8pi 
l
0:04/i
yi
hi
 
;
where Ai is the aid received by country i as a proportion of
GDP, yi is its level of income per capita, and l is the shadow
value of aid. By maximizing poverty reduction worldwide,
Collier and Dollar ensure that the marginal eﬀectiveness of
aid (the marginal eﬀect of a unit of aid on poverty reduction,
controlling for quality of policy and institutions, and its inter-
action with aid) is equalized between countries. From the
above equation, it is evident that the amount of aid received
by a country relative to its GDP varies negatively with its level
of average per capita income, but positively with the quality of
its governance, its poverty index, and the value of its elasticity
of poverty reduction. In other words, holding the level of pov-
erty constant, aid should increase with quality of policy and,
holding quality constant, it should increase with poverty. 3
In addition, the above equation shows that, as aid becomes
more abundant (which is translated into a fall of the shadow
value of aid, l), the share of aid in GDP rises for all recipient
countries. However, the increase in this proportion will not be
equal between them: it will be larger in countries with higher
values of the ratio of per capita income to poverty index. In
other words, when the volume of aid is larger, less needy
countries—that is, those with higher per capita incomes and/or
lower poverty incidence—are those in which aid ﬂow as a pro-
portion of own GDP increases more. Unfortunately, this does
not answer the key question of how the comparative shares of
more and less needy countries in the total aid budget change
as the amount of aid resources varies.Wealso need to stress that,
in the above speciﬁcation of the aid allocation problem, there is
no trade-oﬀ between considerations of needs and considerations
of governance. This follows from the fact thatCollier andDollar
have simpliﬁed this problem by assuming separability between
needs (as expressed by y/h) and quality of governance (p).
These two limitations of the Collier–Dollar framework also
apply to the reﬁnements proposed by Llavador and Roemer
(2001), Cogneau and Naudet (2007), and Wood (2008). Llava-
dor and Roemer’s equal opportunity approach is based on a
particular interpretation of the growth equation estimated by
Burnside andDollar (2000). The growth equation takes on a lin-
ear form in which the growth performance of a country depends
on a number of macroeconomic indicators which Llavador and
Roemer consider as policy outcomes resulting from the coun-
try’s eﬀort, on the one hand, and a variety of circumstances con-
sidered to be beyond the country’s control, on the other hand.
For the sake of simplicity, they also assume that the level of
eﬀort applied by a country is independent of the amount of
aid it receives. Such eﬀort only depends on how much growth
it produces and the disutility of eﬀort (assumed to be
country-speciﬁc). The spirit of the approach is that poor coun-
tries ought not to be penalized for a growth-adverse environ-
ment (bad circumstances) for which they cannot be deemed
responsible. 4Aid serves the purpose of compensating countries
for inherited disadvantages while allowing eﬀort to produce
“natural reward”. In other words, the idea of equalizing oppor-
tunities is that external resources should be set in such away that
the levels of welfare ﬁnally achieved by the recipient countrieswill be reﬂective only of their eﬀort. The objective is thus to
reduce diﬀerential outcomes in so far as they are due to diﬀeren-
tial circumstances, but it does not try to reduce diﬀerential out-
comes in so far as they are due to diﬀerential eﬀort.
Cogneau and Naudet (2007) have also adopted the equal
opportunity approach heralded by Llavador and Roemer
(2001) and they also use the dynamic framework used by Col-
lier and Dollar. Yet, in their attempt equality of opportunity
concerns the risk of poverty: the objective of the donor is there-
fore to equalize the poverty risk as much as possible between
the developing countries, implying that aid should be allocated
to minimize poverty level diﬀerences by a given date chosen in
the future. The optimal allocation of aid then comprises three
groups of countries: (i) countries with both a bad poverty pro-
spect and a low capacity to absorb aid which get the maximum
amount of aid support; (ii) countries with bad prospects and a
reasonably good aid absorption capacity, which get less aid
than the maximum and have equalized poverty risks among
themselves, and (iii) countries with better prospects of reducing
poverty over time, which get zero aid. The ﬁrst group of coun-
tries has heterogeneous poverty risks that are higher than the
homogeneous risks of the second group, but aid cannot help
them further (Cogneau & Naudet, 2007, p. 111).
Without using the equal opportunity approach explicitly,
Wood (2008) has a similar concern for future rather than cur-
rent levels of poverty.He therefore proposes a framework based
on Collier and Dollar’s paper that looks ahead to what poverty
will be at a future time in the absence of aid. The underlying idea
is that countries that are better able to cope with poverty
through their growth dynamics and their institutions should
receive less aid than countries with similar initial levels of pov-
erty but smaller ability to reduce poverty over time.
The two limitations of Collier and Dollar’s framework
which we have mentioned earlier and also characterize the
above approaches inspired by that framework have been
explicitly addressed by Bourguignon and Platteau (2013). 5
They retain the same basic idea that the donor takes into
account considerations of both poverty and governance qual-
ity while allocating aid between countries. However, in order
to avoid the complication of a growth dynamic equation
and to arrive at a purely analytical expression of the aid allo-
cation formula, they encapsulate these two types of consider-
ations into the donor’s objective function itself. This is done
by assuming that, owing to embezzlement or mismanagement
on the part of the elite of the recipient country (the so-called
leader), only a fraction of the aid amount received by a coun-
try actually reaches the poor. In a two-country framework,
this objective function thus takes the following simple form:
W ¼ N 1Log y1 þ
s1T ð1 s1Þ
N 1
 
þ N 2Log y2 þ
s2T ð1 s2Þ
N 2
 
; ð1Þ
where y1 and y2 are the incomes per capita of countries 1 and
2, respectively, N1 and N2 are their population sizes, T is the
total amount of aid available, s1 and s2 are the shares of total
aid going to countries 1 and 2, while s1 and s2 are the propor-
tions of aid ﬂows appropriated by their respective leaders. The
main argument in the function is, therefore, the level of
income per capita in country i once the eﬀect of aid transfer
is taken into account (Ai ¼ siT ). The weight ascribed to a
country is proportional to the size of its population. It is clear
from the above expression that the aid agency faces a trade-oﬀ
between needs and governance. Other things being equal, it
would prefer to help the poorer country, yet if domestic gov-
12 WORLD DEVELOPMENTernance is too low in that country, it would derive a higher
utility by helping the richer but better governed country
(assuming identical population sizes in the two countries).
Limiting attention to the case where the two countries
receive a positive share of the aid fund, the allocation formula
is:
s1 ¼ N 1N 1 þ N 2 þ
1
T
ðx2  x1Þ N 1N 2N 1 þ N 2 ; with; x1
¼ y1
1 s1 ; x2 ¼
y2
1 s2 ð2Þ
When population sizes are identical (N 1 ¼ N 2), the formula
simpliﬁes to:
s1 ¼ 1
2
þ 1
T
ðx2  x1ÞN 1
2
; s2 ¼ 1 s1
To interpret the above expression, we must ﬁrst highlight
the meaning of xi. This parameter measures the
need-adjusted aid ineﬀectiveness of country i, since it decreases
as the extent of needs of the country increases (the lower yi the
lower xi) and its governance quality improves (the lower si the
lower xi). The diﬀerential ðx2  x1Þ therefore reﬂects the com-
parative disadvantage of country 2 relative to country 1 (or the
comparative advantage of country 1 relative to country 2) in
terms of eligibility for aid. When this diﬀerential is positive,
country 1 receives more than half the total amount of aid
available and country 2 less than half. Moreover, the larger
the diﬀerential the higher the share of country 1. Obviously,
xi can be (comparatively) high because country i is relatively
rich, or because its governance is relatively poor, or both.
The trade-oﬀ between needs and governance is thus well
encapsulated in the aid allocation formula derived from the
maximization of W by the donor.
Coming to the central theme of this paper, we also verify
that the country shares depend on the total amount of aid
available, T. More precisely, the share which a country
receives increases with the total amount available if its
need-adjusted aid ineﬀectiveness exceeds that of the other
country, otherwise it decreases: ds1=dT70() x17x2. In
other words, a larger availability of aid works in favor of
the less (need-adjusted) aid-eﬀective country and, conversely,
scarce aid funds are allocated in priority to the more
(need-adjusted) aid-eﬀective country. This happens because
the marginal utilities are necessarily equal at the optimum,
driving the donor to allocate equally the additional aid avail-
able. 6 When the two populations are identical in size, the
equilibrium share of the country less attractive for the donor
(the country with the highest need-adjusted aid ineﬀectiveness)
is smaller than the share of the other country. If the total
amount of aid is marginally increased, the donor responds
by increasing the ﬂow accruing to each country by the same
absolute amount. As a consequence, the share of the country
which initially had the lowest share increases.
Going beyond the case of an interior solution, an interesting
implication of the latter result is the following: there exists a
critical value of the diﬀerential ðx2  x1Þ such that, if it is
exceeded, the donor chooses to earmark the whole aid fund
to the less (need-adjusted) aid-ineﬀective country, in this
instance country 1 (assuming that the diﬀerential is positive),
and gives nothing to the other country (country 2). It is easy
to see that this critical value is equal to T=N 1. Formally:
s1 ¼ 1; s2 ¼ 0() x2  x1 > T=N 1. What bears emphasis is
the critical role played by T: the larger the aid fund available
to the donor, the more likely will the above condition be vio-
lated and, therefore, the less likely will country 2 be deprived
of aid. Yet, if T is too low, exclusion of that country isunavoidable. Such exclusion may be deemed regrettable if it
is very poor (y2 is quite low) and at the same time very badly
governed (s2 is quite high). Unfortunately, these two attributes
often go together and tend to characterize “failed states”.
Bourguignon and Platteau prove that the above result can
be generalized to any number of recipient countries: as the
amount of total aid increases, the donor allocates aid to an
increasing number of countries which exhibit higher and
higher (need-adjusted) aid ineﬀectiveness.
The donor’s objective function (1) chosen by Bourguignon
and Platteau has a logarithmic form. It is, therefore, legitimate
to ask whether their results would hold under a more general
utility function. For example, instead of logarithmic arguments,
one could use power functions whose exponent measures the
donor’s aversion to poverty. What bears emphasis is that, under
this new speciﬁcation, the direction of all the comparative static
results would remain unchanged (in particular, the eﬀect of total
aid supply). Of course, the equilibrium shares of each recipient
country would be modiﬁed: the more poverty-averse the donor
the higher the share of the poorer country compared to what is
obtained under the logarithmic speciﬁcation.
(ii) Allocating aid between two heterogeneous countries when
domestic governance is endogenous
The problem becomes much more complex, but also much
more interesting and relevant, when the domestic governance
of the recipient countries is considered to be susceptible of
improvement by the donor’s actions. The above predicament
in which the poorest, but also worse governed, country
receives no aid is then remediable even when the total amount
of aid cannot be increased. As a matter of fact, if the donor
can inﬂuence the outcome of domestic governance, through
monitoring of the uses of aid and the meting out of sanctions,
the exclusion of the ill-governed and needy country need not
happen. Even though monitoring and sanctioning are costly
for the donor, the latter may choose to incur these expendi-
tures and include that country in his aid program.
Because the outcome of domestic governance in the recipient
countries is endogenous, the donor, now acting as a principal,
has six decision variables at hand to maximize his utility given
by W: the shares of aid allocated to each country, the level of
monitoring precision and the severity of the sanctions to be
implemented assuming that both disciplining instruments can
be tailored to each country’s situation. Sanctions are imposed
when fraud is detected, and this occurs with a probability that
itself depends on monitoring precision. On the other hand, act-
ing as agents, the leaders (elite) of each recipient country
choose the level of aid appropriation given the monitoring
eﬀort and the level of punishment set by the donor.
A key feature of themodel used byBourguignon and Platteau
is that it allows to depict the intrinsic domestic governance pre-
vailing in each recipient country. This is done through a param-
eter which measures the internal “taxation” rate of any income
that the leader would appropriate. A high value of this param-
eter (a high rate of “taxation”) means that the leader is strongly
internally disciplined whereas a low value points to the opposite
situation where the leader (elite group) can easily embezzle
funds targeted by the donor at the (poor) population. There
are thus two distinct mechanisms that discipline national elites:
an internal mechanism translated in an exogenously given “tax-
ation” rate of the aid ﬂow appropriated by the elite, on the one
hand, and an external monitoring-cum-punishment mechanism
endogenously set by the donor, on the other hand. The opera-
tion of these two mechanisms yields the endogenous outcome
of governance, i.e., the appropriation (embezzlement) rate cho-
sen by the elite or leader.
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donor’s problem is rather straightforward. This case arises
when (i) the participation constraints of the leaders of both
countries are binding (their expected utility from embezzling
aid money does not exceed the cost of handling it); and (ii)
the costs of monitoring and sanctioning are negligible. When
these two conditions are obtained, the donor equalizes the rate
of elite’s appropriation of aid funds across the two recipient
countries, thus putting more eﬀort on the country which is
intrinsically less well governed. The allocation formula will
then be quite similar to that obtained with exogenous gover-
nance, except for the fact that the measure of need-adjusted
aid ineﬀectiveness for a country is now entirely determined
by its level of per capita income: since s1 ¼ s2, the diﬀerential
ðx2  x1Þ depends only on the diﬀerence between y2 and y1.
Because the comparative disadvantage of the poorer country
in terms of governance has been erased, and only poverty
therefore inﬂuences the donor’s choice, it will never be denied
aid by the donor whereas this can be true of the richer country.
However, the richer country is less likely to be excluded if the
total amount of aid available is greater.
In the more realistic case in which no participation constraint
is binding and disciplining costs are not negligible, a number of
important analytical results have been obtained by the authors.
Two of these results (or sets of results) deserve to be pinpointed
here. First, and somewhat surprisingly, it is only when the ini-
tial disparity between the governance levels of the two recipient
countries is wide enough that the donor’s external disciplining
has the eﬀect of raising the share of aid accruing to the poorest
and worst-governed country. When the initial disparity is
rather small, however, the opposite eﬀect may be achieved.
More precisely, when the disparity is large, the share received
by the poorest and worst-governed country always increases
when governance is endogenized, regardless of the initial
income gap between the two countries. Yet, when the initial
disparity in governance levels is narrow enough, endogenizing
discipline will raise the share of that country only if its income
is not too low relative to that of the other country.
The second set of results concerns comparisons between dif-
ferent situations when the donor is able to adjust its disciplin-
ing instruments in an optimal manner. Toward the purpose of
presenting these results, we have drawn a schematic represen-
tation of the simulation results obtained in more detail in
Bourguignon and Platteau (2013). The ﬁgure depicts the situ-
ation prevailing for country 2, which is assumed to be less well
governed (intrinsically) than country 1, the reference country.
We measure the share of aid along the vertical axis and per
capita income along the horizontal axis. The per capita income
of country 1 is ﬁxed at a given value that may be higher or
smaller than the variable value of the same indicator for coun-
try 2. We vary the total amount of aid available, considering
two cases: a comparatively large T (corresponding to the bold
lines) and a comparatively low T (corresponding to the dotted
lines). We also vary the intrinsic level of domestic governance
in country 2, examining again two cases: weak governance (in
the area close to the vertical axis) and strong governance (fur-
ther away from that axis).
Three conclusions emerge from Figure 1, and it is important
to stress that they are quite general in the sense that they con-
tinue to hold when one or two participation constraints are
binding. First, the negative slope of each line means that, for
a given level of intrinsic domestic governance, the share of
country 2 in total aid increases as its average per capita income
declines. This result reﬂects the need-based logic behind the
donor’s allocation problem. Second, a comparison between
two lines of the same type (either bold or dotted) across thetwo governance domains (weak and strong) shows the follow-
ing: for a given amount of total aid and given the characteris-
tics of country 1, when country 2’s income level is raised, it can
only retain the same share of aid if its intrinsic governance is
suﬃciently improved. This second result reﬂects the
need-governance trade-oﬀ.
Third, and most relevant to our central concern in this
paper, the comparison between the bold and the dotted lines
in a given domain of governance reveals the nature of the
inﬂuence of total aid supply on aid allocation. The fact that
the dotted lines cut the bold lines from above implies that,
other things being equal, country 2 receives a larger share of
the aid fund when this fund is comparatively small, but only
if its income level is not too high. When its per capita income
exceeds the threshold corresponding to the intersection of the
two lines, the opposite outcome is achieved: country 2 receives
a lower share of the small aid fund.
Moreover, when the governance quality of country 2
improves, the threshold value beyond which the eﬀect reversal
occurs is increased (see the arrow in Figure 1). This result is
plainly within the logic of the need-governance trade-oﬀ: if
the quality of intrinsic governance is parametrically improved
in country 2 (the worse governed country) compared to the
better governed country (country 1, the reference country
whose internal “taxation” rate is ﬁxed), it can be richer before
it stops beneﬁting, in relative terms, from scarce aid funds.
In the case of exogenous governance, we have seen that a lar-
ger aid supply induces the donor to include more
(need-adjusted) aid-ineﬀective countries in the list of recipient
countries. The same conclusion is obtained in the
above-discussed case of endogenous governance. This becomes
evident from Figure 1 once we bear the following in mind:
when the lines intersect with either the vertical or the horizontal
axis within the [0,1] range, one of the two countries receives no
aid at all. Such a situation arises when a country is suﬃciently
rich given its governance level or, alternatively, when its gover-
nance is suﬃciently weak given its level of income. Since the
line corresponding to the lower aid supply cuts the line corre-
sponding to the larger aid supply from above, and there is a sin-
gle intersection point, the level of per capita income, y2, above
which country 2 stops receiving aid shifts to the right as aid
supply increases. That is, when aid is more abundant, the worse
governed country can become even more aid-ineﬀective and
still remain eligible for receiving aid. Because we keep the qual-
ity of (intrinsic) domestic governance constant, greater
(need-adjusted) aid ineﬀectiveness can only be caused by a
higher level of income (and, hence, a lesser extent of needs).
Conversely, when aid becomes more scarce, the worse gov-
erned country is more at risk of being excluded from the ben-
eﬁt of aid programs. It is in these circumstances that the
donor’s ability to inﬂuence governance by improving upon
the intrinsic characteristics of the recipient countries becomes
important. The donor can then rescue poor but ill-governed
countries from oblivion or neglect. A direct consequence of
this new possibility is that, to operate in failed states or weakly
governed countries, donor agencies should “budget for a con-
siderably higher ratio of administrative costs to money actu-
ally disbursed” (Collier, 2007, p. 118).
Note, ﬁnally, that when the donor applies a uniform disci-
plining treatment to the recipient countries (the values of the
external disciplining variables are assumed to be identical
instead of being tailored to the governance situation of each
recipient country), three outcomes can arise: only the poorer
country is eligible (if it is not too badly governed and the other
country is too rich in relative terms); only the richer country is
eligible (if it is not too rich and the other country is too badly
Figure 1. The impact of aid availability on inter-country aid allocation.
14 WORLD DEVELOPMENTgoverned); or the poorer and the richer countries receive aid
(in the other cases). Again, the quantity of aid resources avail-
able plays a critical role. As it increases, the likelihood of an
inclusive aid program tends to be higher, yet only provided
that the governance levels in the two countries are not too
far apart.4. CONCLUSION, DISCUSSION, AND POLICY
IMPLICATIONS
When the issue of aid is discussed in international circles, it
is implicitly assumed that larger aid availability can have com-
mensurate eﬀects on the welfare of poor people. This is espe-
cially apparent in the ambitious program of the Millennium
Development Goals and in many talks regarding the need
for a Marshall Plan for SubSaharan Africa, for example.
Yet, the eﬀects on aid eﬀectiveness, aid outreach, and the wel-
fare of the poor are not evident in the absence of clearly
deﬁned analytical frameworks.
According to an argument due to Wahhaj (2008), who rea-
sons in terms of aid projects, a greater project size induces the
leader to relax his eﬀort applied to the project or to increase
his embezzlement of aid money need-governance trade-oﬀ.
At the micro-level, aid eﬀectiveness therefore decreases. More-
over, if there are diﬀerent types of local leaders (in terms of
level of altruism), if the type is not observable by the aid
agency, and if the leaders have identical outside options, an
increase in the aid fund allocated to a project induces more
opportunistic leaders (who appropriate a larger portion of
the aid money) to participate. As a consequence, the welfare
of the community may possibly decrease. If one wishes to con-
sider the eﬀects of a larger volume of aid at the aggregate level,
several cases have to be distinguished depending on how the
donor chooses to use an increment in aid resources. In most
of them, aid eﬀectiveness decreases as the total volume of
aid is larger. Moreover, community welfare may possibly
decrease but only in projects where previous leaders are
replaced by less altruistic ones as a result of the increase in
project size. Aid outreach improves or remains unaﬀected.
In Azam–Laﬀont’s approach, as in that of Wahhaj, there is
uncertainty about the type of leaders or governments throughwhom aid money is channeled. If there is more money avail-
able in the rich countries for support to poor countries, then
the governments of the former would presumably decide to
lower the threshold of good governance that makes poor
countries eligible for development assistance. It is hard to be
precise about other eﬀects because the analytical framework
underlying this approach is not fully appropriate to the prob-
lem of inter-country allocation of aid resources.
The conclusion that greater aid availability may cause aid
eﬀectiveness to fall is also obtained in contexts where the aid
agency (or the consortium of aid agencies) knows the level
of governance prevailing in each potential recipient country
or community. In Gaspart and Platteau’s set-up, more plenti-
ful aid is reﬂected in a lower cost of access to ﬁnancial
resources for the aid (implementing) agency. They show that
greater aid availability may be harmful to the poor (the
amount of money reaching them falls) if the project size is pos-
itively linked to the cost of aid money and there are increasing
returns-to-scale in the aid activity.
In Bourguignon and Platteau’s paper, the need-governance
trade-oﬀ is brought to center stage in a one-donor–
two-recipient framework. When the donor is unable to improve
domestic governance through the use of disciplining instru-
ments, the conclusion is rather straightforward. Assuming that
the poorer country is also the least well governed (so that the
trade-oﬀ exists), the donor is all the more likely to include both
the (relatively) rich and poor countries in its aid program as the
available aid fund is larger. If, on the contrary, the aid fund is
rather small, the donor may well choose to concentrate its sup-
port exclusively on the richer and better governed country. This
will happen when the governance in the poorer country is too
low compared to its level in the richer country. The inclusion
of all countries, regardless of their governance levels, when aid
is suﬃciently abundant, follows from the fact that the marginal
utility of the donor with respect to the income level of a given
country is decreasing, and this eﬀect becomes strong when the
total amount of aid is large.
The above conclusion essentially holds when the outcome of
governance can be inﬂuenced by the donor, and external dis-
cipline is tailored to the governance situation of each recipient
country. It is only in a rather special and spurious case, –the
participation constraints of the two leaders are binding and
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diﬀerent result is achieved: the poorer country can never be
excluded from the aid program. By contrast, the richer coun-
try can be excluded if it is relatively too rich and total aid
resources are too limited.
When the donor can inﬂuence the outcome of domestic gov-
ernance, yet only by applying a uniform disciplining treatment
to the recipient countries, the three following outcomes can
arise: only the poorer country is eligible (if it is not too badly
governed and the other country is too rich in relative terms);
only the richer country is eligible (if it is not too rich and
the other country is too badly governed); or the poorer and
the richer countries receive aid (in the other cases). Again,
the quantity of aid resources available plays a critical role.
As it increases, the likelihood of an inclusive aid program
tends to be higher, yet provided only that the governance
levels in the two countries are not too far apart.
Note carefully that the aforementioned conclusions rest on
the assumption that there exists a single donor agency or, what
comes down to the same thing, an eﬀective coalition of donors.
If donors are unwilling or unable to coordinate their aid poli-
cies, the positive, inclusive eﬀects of larger aid availability
may not materialize. This is particularly evident when the
increase in aid supply takes on the form of a multiplication
of donors acting independently (or, in Wahhaj’s framework, a
multiplication of projects). The phenomenon of “aid darlings”
and “aid orphans” is also a consequence of uncoordinated
aid allocation by individual donors. Finally, donor coordination
may help to improve the eﬃciency of monitoring and punish-
ment mechanisms, in particular through exploitation of scale
economies and wide circulation of information about fraudu-
lent behavior in the use of aid funds. It can also be argued that,
for a particular donor who considers the actions of other
donors as given, decisions regarding both aid allocation and
monitoring expenditures depend on the total aid budget. We
thus expect small donor countries to focus their aid eﬀort on
a restricted number of countries (see Bourguignon & Platteau,
2015, for an extensive analysis). In this regard, it may be noted
that, in the measure of aid performance proposed by Roodman
(2012), dispersion on a large number of projects is taken as an
indicator of low quality of aid eﬀort, while concentration has
the opposite interpretation.
From Bourguignon and Platteau’s eﬀort, two major lessons
need to be drawn. First, when the donor has the ability to add
external to internal discipline, badly governed countries are
more likely to receive aid. It is true that the use of such instru-
ments is costly for the donor, but the costs involved are taken
into account in the donor’s optimization problem.Second, the fact that, under exogenous governance or under
endogenous governance with individualized disciplining treat-
ment, greater aid availability triggers an “inclusive”move (that
is, a shift from a regime where only the richer and better gov-
erned country receives aid to a regime where both the poorer
and the richer countries do) implies that marginal and average
aid eﬀectiveness decrease as aid resources become more abun-
dant. 7 Yet, when the donor’s utility function balances needs
against governance considerations, it is evident that it is no
more meaningful to be concerned with the criterion of aid eﬀec-
tiveness understood as the outcome of domestic governance.
What matters is how many among the poorest can be reached
cost-eﬀectively by the donor, and this is precisely the objective
pursued by the donor possessing such a utility function. If we
adopt the Rawls criterion as the appropriate yardstick to assess
aid policies, stressing outreach instead of eﬀectiveness, the
above situation of increasing “inclusiveness” should cause
relief rather than concern. On the other hand, the situation
where, under uniform disciplining treatment, greater availabil-
ity of aid has the eﬀect of making the richer and better gov-
erned country eligible while it was excluded in the initial
situation, gives rise to an ambiguous judgment. This is because
the poorer people then get a lower share (less than 100%) of a
larger total aid fund. Therefore, we do not know whether their
welfare increases or decreases. At the same time, the average
eﬀectiveness of aid is unambiguously raised.
In conclusion, the result according to which greater aid
availability has the eﬀect of lowering aid eﬀectiveness holds
under a variety of conceptual frameworks. Yet, the mecha-
nism underlying the decreasing return to aid diﬀers according
to the framework chosen. In particular, the decreasing impact
of aid may either be due to the behavior of the local elites
when they receive a greater amount of external resources on
behalf of their constituency (the project or program size
eﬀect), or to the behavior of the donor agency when it has
more plentiful aid to allocate between potential recipient coun-
tries with diﬀerent characteristics (the selection eﬀect). The for-
mer mechanism is at work in the analytical models of
Gaspart–Platteau and Wahhaj, while the latter is at the heart
of the approach of Bourguignon–Platteau but is also found in
those of Azam–Laﬀont and Wahhaj. Finally, it deserves to be
stressed that under an approach that explicitly embodies a
need-governance trade-oﬀ, such as the one advocated by Bour-
guignon and Platteau, no negative normative judgment can be
inferred from the prediction of diminishing aid eﬀectiveness.
When aid supply increases, a larger number of poor people
can be reached cost-eﬀectively, and this is true of the poorest
people who tend to live in the worst-governed countries.NOTES1. Since there is competition between people in the donor’s country and
the poor in developing countries for the available money, the amount of
aid is endogenous.
2. The results regarding the optimal response of the leader in terms of his
input level rely on the assumption that the project funds and the leader’s
eﬀort are substitutes in the utility that the community derives from the
project.
3. Note that, if the dependent variable is expressed as the share of the
country in total aid rather than as the share of aid in its GDP, all the
comparative-static results continue to hold. The only exception concerns
the eﬀect of y which now follows a parabolic form: share of total aid
increases for low values of y while it decreases for high values.4. For reasons explained in Cogneau and Naudet (2007), the empirical
exercise attempted by Llavador and Roemer produces results that
contradict the principles underlying the equal opportunity approach (aid
ends up being allocated to countries enjoying the best circumstances).
5. In Wood’s contribution (2008), what donors want to reduce is a
combination of current and future poverty. Therefore, they take into
account the recipient countries’ ability to reduce poverty over time when
they make their aid allocation decisions.
6. This equilibrium outcome is obtained because we have assumed that
the two countries receive a positive share of the aid fund. This assumption
is not innocuous because it implies that the donor has a suﬃciently large
budget to be able to equalize marginal utilities in two recipient countries
16 WORLD DEVELOPMENTwhose incomes are very diﬀerent. For example, it is diﬃcult to imagine
that the United Kingdom alone can equalize post-transfer incomes in
Nigeria and Ethiopia. The solution to this problem, as seen by
Bourguignon and Platteau, consists of adjusting the donor’s utility
function in such a way that T is multiplied by a factor greater than one, so
as to reﬂect the donor’s higher sensitivity to his own transfers than to the
income generated by the recipient countries.7. The same “inclusive” outcome may actually be obtained when the
donor applies a uniform discipline to the two countries. Under the
uniform treatment system, the shift caused by an increase in aid supply
may also be from a regime in which both countries receive aid to a regime
where only the poorer and more badly governed country has access to the
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